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Abstract: This paper sets out a theory of torts and cyberspace wrongs.  Its goal is to set 
out a sparse theoretical account of tort law and apply it to cyberspace torts, both negligent 
and intentional.  I approach this goal by applying the framework of property rules and 
liability rules to cyberspace torts.  That framework suggests that trespass doctrine is 
appropriate in instances of cyber-invasions of private information resources, such as the 
breaking of codes to access private information on the web.  However, trespass doctrine 
should play no role in cyber-invasions of public information resources, such as the 
sending of spam email.  I also examine indirect liability claims against operating system 
sellers or internet service providers for the harms caused by cyberspace actors (e.g., virus 
writers, copyright violators).  The theory presented here suggests that the basis for strict 
indirect liability is weak.  Finally, the theory suggests that immunity rules should play a 
role in this area, though in a smaller set of instances than those protected by the 
Communications Decency Act.
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 Legislative proposals to usher in an era of “electronic medicine” have helped 
identify as a puzzle the failure of the medical industry to keep up with information 
technology.1  Many have noted that financial records and credit histories are contained in 
electronic libraries, while medical records are still stored in manila folders.2  Perhaps one 
reason for this is the number of things that can go wrong with information technology or, 
more simply, software. 
Consider just a few examples of the things that could go wrong with software in 
the medical industry.  Suppose a company introduces a cardiac defibrillator (a machine 
that emits an electric jolt to correct an irregular heartbeat) that is surgically inserted into 
the patient’s body and uses a software program to govern itself as well as allow 
physicians to monitor its activity.  Suppose a defect in the software causes the electric 
impulses to fire at the wrong times or fail to fire at the right times. 
 As a second example, suppose medical patient records are stored in an electronic 
library.  A hacker gets access to the library and alters records.  Third, suppose a hacker 
releases a “spider” that crawls through medical records and forwards the information to 
others or makes it publicly available.  Or, returning to the defibrillator example, suppose 
the hacker finds a way to control the functioning of the defibrillator.  It is easy to see that 
the harms that might result from defective or insecure software in the medical setting 
could be orders of magnitude greater than those observed in the more common settings 
                                                 
1 For an example of a recent legislative proposal to introduce electronic medicine, see Statements & 
Releases, New York Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Frist, Clinton Introduce Health Technology to 
Enhance Quality Act (June 16, 2005), 
http://www.senate.gov/~clinton/news/statements/details.cfm?id=239875.  
2 See, e.g., IT in the Health Care Industry, ECONOMIST, April 30, 2005, at 65. 
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involving financial records.  Fear of the potential harm and resultant liability could be a 
major reason technology companies have not rushed in to the electronic medicine market. 
Electronic medicine is just one of many examples in ordinary life in which 
software flaws can lead to serious harms, and liability for those harms.  We already have 
examples of computer viruses that have caused enormous damage to property and to 
commercial transactions.3  And each of us by now is familiar with the problem of “spam” 
electronic mail and the burdens it imposes. 
 This paper attempts to set out a general theory of torts and cyberspace wrongs.  It 
differs from the previous literature in this area by avoiding the piecemeal approach taken 
in most articles.4  The goal here is to start with a theoretical account of tort law and to 
apply that to cyberspace torts, both negligent and intentional.  I approach this goal by 
applying the framework of property rules and liability rules to cyberspace torts.  That 
framework suggests that trespass doctrine is appropriate in instances of cyber-invasions 
of private information resources, such as the breaking of codes to access private 
information on the web.  However, trespass doctrine should play no role in instances of 
                                                 
3 See, Robert W. Hahn and Ann Layne-Farrar, The Law and Economics of Software Security, draft on file 
with author, pp.15-20 (detailing costs of software security breaches), 2006. 
4 I do not intend the description “piecemeal” as pejorative.  I am simply referring to the tendency in the 
literature to focus on one particular type of cyberspace tort theory, such as trespass or nuisance.   For 
examples of excellent articles that are in the piecemeal tradition, see Adam Mossoff, Spam – Oy, What a 
Nuisance!, 19 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 625 (2004); Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73 
(2003).  There are articles that have taken a more general approach to determining the appropriate legal 
regime.  Most of these articles focus on the appropriate analogy or metaphor for thinking about torts in 
cyberspace.  See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Trouble With Trespass, 4 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 27 (2000); 
Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 439 
(2003); Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 521 (2003); Richard A. Epstein, Intel v. 
Hamidi, The Role of Self-Help in Cyberspace?, 1 J. Law Econ. & Policy 147 (2005); David McGowan, 
The Trespass Trouble and the Metaphor Muddle, 1 J. L. Econ. & Policy 109 (2005); Maureen O’Rourke, 
Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 Berkeley Tech. 
L. J. 561 (2001); Jonathan J. Rusch, Cyberspace and the “Devil’s Hatband”, 24 Seattle U. L. Rev. 577 
(2001); Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace, 17 
Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1207 (2002).  See generally, Symposium: Property Rights on the Frontier: The 
Economics of Self-Help and Self-Defense in Cyberspace, J. Law, Economics & Policy, volume 1, Winter 
2005.  The present paper differs from this literature in the sense that it sets up a general framework for tort 
law and shows that it applies to cyberspace wrongs. 
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cyber-invasions of public information resources, such as the sending of spam email.  
Another set of cases I examine are those in which plaintiffs assert indirect liability claims 
against operating system sellers, internet service providers, or software developers for the 
harms caused by some cyberspace actors (e.g., virus writers, copyright violators).  The 
theory presented here suggests that the basis for strict indirect liability is weak.  Finally, 
the theory suggests that immunity rules should play a role in this area, though in a much 
smaller set of instances than in existing law. 
 
II. A Few Examples 
 
To get a clearer sense of the problems that arise in this area, I will start by 
describing a few of the better known cases in the intersection of torts and cyberspace.  Of 
course, information technology is constantly evolving, so a description of previous cases 
may not tell us much about the problems that will arise in the future.  Still, the previous 
cases have set out several issues that courts are still grappling with in their efforts to 
apply tort law to a new realm. 
 In Blumenthal v. Drudge,5 Matt Drudge reported in his column disseminated by 
America Online that Clinton White House aide Sidney Blumenthal had physically abused 
his wife in the past.  Blumenthal filed a defamation suit against Drudge and America 
Online.  At the time of the suit, America Online paid Drudge $3,000 per month to write 
the column, and exercised certain editorial rights over the column’s content, including the 
right to demand changes and to remove it.6  Still, the court found that America Online 
                                                 
5 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
6 Id. at 51. 
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was entitled to immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.7  The 
trial judge noted that if he were “writing on a clean slate”,8 he would have held America 
Online liable in accordance with the legal standards applied to ordinary publishers. 
 In Intel Corp. v. Hamidi,9 the plaintiff Intel Corporation maintained an electronic 
mail system accessible by the internet.  A former employee of Intel sent thousands of 
emails (up to 35,000 at a time) criticizing the company’s employment practices to Intel 
employees.10  Intel filed suit, claiming that the emails distributed without the company’s 
consent constituted trespass to chattels.  Reversing an injunction issued by the lower 
court, the California Supreme Court held that in order to prevail on a trespass-to-chattels 
theory the plaintiff had to prove some actual injury resulting from the defendant’s 
conduct.11  Intel had not presented evidence of an actual injury to the functioning of their 
electronic mail system. 
 The third and last example needs no specific legal case, and there have been no 
reported cases litigated to judgment involving civil liability.12  Consider a virus 
disseminated by electronic mail that injures thousands of computer users by destroying 
files or damaging hard drives.  In every such instance there is usually some step that an 
operating system seller or internet service provider could have taken to prevent the spread 
of the virus.  Some commentators have argued that operating system sellers should be 
held strictly liable for viruses, since the expected liability would cause the price of the 
                                                 
7 Id. at 52-53. 
8 Id. at 51. 
9 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003). 
10 Id. at 301. 
11 Id. at 306. 
12 One claim for damages was filed by a victim of identity theft in 2003, Steve Lohr, Product Liability 
Lawsuits are New Threat to Microsoft, N.Y. Times, October 6, 2003, at C2. There have been criminal 
prosecutions, see Victor Homola, World Briefing Europe: Germany: Sasser Hacker is Sentenced, N. Y. 
Times, July 9, 2005, at A2. 
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relatively insecure operating system to rise in comparison to the relatively secure 
system.13  However, strict liability is not the rule, and there have been no reported cases 
of third-party (or indirect) liability for viruses. 
 Although there are many other examples of torts in cyberspace,14 the examples 
just given present three general issues with which courts have only begun to grapple.  The 
first, represented by the Blumenthal case, is whether internet service providers (or, more 
generally, others connected to the internet) should be immune for defamation and other 
information-based torts (e.g., intentional infliction of emotional distress) because the 
societal benefits of free communication are so great relative to the isolated harms 
resulting from the relatively infrequent intentional tort.  The second issue, represented by 
Hamidi, is whether the rules of trespass, nuisance, or negligence should apply to torts in 
cyberspace.15  In terms familiar to legal academics, the question is whether “property 
rules” or “liability rules” should apply to cyberspace torts.  The third issue, represented 
by the virus example, concerns the choice among liability rules – should they be based on 
strict liability or negligence principles? 
 The underlying premise of this paper is that the theories reflected in tort doctrine 
are general and ought to apply without any serious modifications to cyberspace torts.  
There is no need for a special field of cybertort law.  However, because cyberspace torts 
are novel, they provide lawyers an opportunity to gain a deeper appreciation and 
understanding of the rules that they have studied for so long. 
                                                 
13 Douglas Lichtman, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, Regulation, Winter 2004-2005, 54-
59; Douglas Lichtman and Eric A. Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 Supreme 
Court Economic Review 221 (2006).  
14 See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn and Ann Layne-Farrar, supra note 3, at 6 (describing several categories of 
cyber-attack: denial of service, viruses (or worms), phishes, spyware, trojan horses, and program back 
doors). 
15 Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73 (2003). 
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III. General Issues 
  
As the examples discussed in the previous section suggest, there are three general 
issues raised by cyberspace torts.  The first is whether and specifically where property 
rules or liability rules should apply in this area of torts.16  Property rules are exemplified 
by trespass doctrine.  A property rule, such as trespass, permits the party protected by the 
rule to enjoin the injuring party and to collect damages for any violations that occur.17  
Property rule protection forces the potential injurer or invader to bargain with the 
protected party in order to gain access to the protected party’s property.  In order to gain 
access under the property rule, the invader will have to meet the demand price of the 
protected party, which will be set high enough to cover the protected party for all the 
injuries that party perceives to be associated with giving access to the invader.  If, for 
example, the invader is incapable of doing any harm to the protected party’s property, but 
the protected party still wants to be compensated for the mere thought that someone else 
will have access to his property, that perceived harm will be part of the demand price the 
protected party communicates to the potential invader. 
 Liability rules, in contrast, do not permit the protected party to enjoin the injuring 
party.  For example, a negligence lawsuit brought against a careless driver is an instance 
in which a victim asserts liability rule protection.  There is no background assumption 
that the careless driver should have obtained permission from the victim to impose the 
                                                 
16 On property and liability rules generally, see Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972). 
17 Id. at 1092. 
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risk of an injury.  The liability rule seeks simply to reallocate to the injurer some 
objective estimate of the victim’s loss after it has occurred. 
 The second general issue raised by cyberspace torts is, assuming liability rules 
apply, what type of liability rule should apply and specifically where?  Tort law provides 
two general types of liability rule: strict liability and negligence.  The key difference 
between the two is that under negligence, courts inquire into the care that the injurer took 
in his conduct, while under strict liability there is no inquiry into the injurer’s level of 
care.  Strict liability sounds like “absolute liability”, in the sense of imposing liability 
simply for acting.  But there are few if any examples of absolute liability in the law.  
Most cases of strict liability involve some point at which the injurer made a choice to 
impose harms on the victim; for example, by choosing to locate his smoke-belching 
factory next door to the victim’s house.  And it is this choice that the law aims to control 
through strict liability. 
 The third general issue raised by cyberspace torts is whether there should be any 
liability at all.  The issue is actually more complicated.  Perhaps the better way to state 
the issue is the degree to which some liability rule weaker or more lenient than 
negligence should apply.  “Weak negligence” rules would couple the negligence rule’s 
general inquiry into fault with a set of broad defenses that would often permit the injurer 
to avoid liability altogether.  Should there be absolute immunity or “weak negligence” in 
the field of cyberspace, and specifically where should immunity or weak negligence rules 
apply? 
I take up each of these issues in the following section, though I will focus on torts 
generally.  I will synthesize existing theories and extend them in order to provide a 
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framework that explains the overall shape as well as the details of tort law.  After setting 
out a positive framework, I will apply it to cyberspace torts. 
 
A. Property Rules Versus Liability Rules Generally 
 
In a famous 1972 essay Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed answered the 
general question of “property rules versus liability rules”.18  Their answer, which can be 
summarized easily, depends largely on the distribution of “transaction costs,” i.e., the 
costs of arranging and completing a transaction to transfer an entitlement.  According to 
Calabresi and Melamed, property rules are desirable in settings where transaction costs 
are low, and liability rules are desirable in settings where transaction costs are high.19  
Property rules are best in low transaction cost settings because they protect entitlement 
holders from expropriation and thereby encourage consensual transactions.  In high 
transaction cost settings, bargaining is infeasible, so society establishes a convention 
under which the entitlement can be transferred at an objectively determined price.  The 
standard liability rule, implemented by a court, provides this convention. 
There is another context in which property rules are desirable because they 
prohibit unconditionally.  That is when the activity of the injuring party is socially 
undesirable, no matter the scale at which it is carried out.20  This category was implicit in 
the analysis of Calabresi and Melamed,21 and has been explored more explicitly in later 
                                                 
18 Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972). 
19 Id. 1105-1109. 
20 Keith N. Hylton, Property and Liability Rules, Once Again, forthcoming Review of Law and Economics, 
2006, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=818944. 
21 Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 15, at 1124-1127 (discussing criminal law). 
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articles.22  Reckless conduct, such as joy-riding at an excessive speed through an area 
crowded with pedestrians, serves as an example of this property rule context. 
 The general scheme of tort law fits the Calabresi-Melamed theory well.  Property 
rules, exemplified by trespass doctrine, are observed in the context of invasions to real or 
personal property, typically in settings in which the invader easily could have bargained 
with the property holder to gain access.  They are also observed in cases of reckless 
conduct, which the law enjoins rather than simply asking for compensation. 
 Liability rules, on the other hand, are observed in settings such as traffic 
accidents, where the parties could not have bargained beforehand to arrange a price that 
would be paid for any specific injuries.  The traffic accident setting is one of the clearest 
cases in which transaction costs are high.  The parties to a potential traffic accident are 
often strangers and cannot identify each other in advance. 
 In recent years, the simple two-part scheme of Calabresi and Melamed has come 
under attack.  Kaplow and Shavell,23 providing the most forceful critique, argue that in 
the case of low transaction costs – fully informed agents who can identify each other and 
bargain over the transfer of an entitlement – it does not matter whether the property rule 
or the liability rule applies.24  Under either rule, bargains will take place, and as implied 
by the Coase theorem,25 economically efficient trades will occur.  Kaplow and Shavell 
also examine a case in which the cost of meeting is low but the cost of reaching 
                                                 
22 Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Criminal Law, 85 Columbia L. Rev. 1193 (1985); Keith N. Hylton 
(2005) The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of Criminal Law, Review of Law & Economics: Vol. 1: 
No. 2, Article 1, http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol1/iss2/art1.  
23 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 
Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1996). 
24 Id. at 735. 
25 For the original presentation of the Coase theorem, see R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. 
Law & Econ.1 (1960).  According to the theorem, if transaction costs are low, parties will bargain their 
way to the efficient allocation irrespective of the initial assignment of legal rights. 
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agreement is high because of informational asymmetries.  In this setting, they show that 
liability rules may dominate property rules.26 
 The critique provided by Kaplow and Shavell and others27 has advanced the 
analysis of property and liability rules by incorporating a rigorous analysis of bargaining 
incentives.  However, the results of this new literature can be reconciled with the original 
Calabresi-Melamed analysis.  Property rules still remain preferable to liability rules in 
low transaction cost settings because they deter takings, even efficient ones, and thereby 
protect subjective components of valuation.28  In the absence of such protection, potential 
victims of takings would suffer weakened incentives to invest and victims would sue or 
retaliate to recover losses, generating costs that would be avoided under the property rule 
regime.29  However, the information asymmetry case represents a difficult set of 
examples that do not fit easily within the high-versus-low transaction cost framework of 
Calabresi and Melamed.  A new synthesis should treat the information asymmetry case as 
an altogether new category.30 
 I think it is sufficient, in light of the new bargaining theory literature exemplified 
by Kaplow and Shavell, to distinguish three transaction-cost categories: high, low, and 
intermediate.31  In addition, the costs of transacting can be split into the costs of meeting 
and the costs of reaching an agreement.32  If the costs of meeting are prohibitive then 
transactions will not occur, and it is clearly a case of high transaction costs.  If the costs 
                                                 
26 Id. at 779-87. 
27 Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean 
Trade, 104 Yale L. J. 1027 (1995). 
28 Hylton, Property Rules and Liability Rules, Once Again, supra note 17.  Even in a rigorous analysis of 
bargaining incentives, it still remains the case that liability rules result in expropriation, and expropriation 
generates social costs. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 5. 
31 Id. at 5-6. 
32 Id. 
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of meeting are low and the costs of reaching agreement high, then we have intermediate 
transaction costs.33  If both the costs of meeting and the costs of reaching agreement are 
low, then it is a case of low transaction costs. 
 If, then, we distinguish cases of high, low, and intermediate transaction costs, we 
can state a proposition that incorporates the lessons from the bargaining theory literature 
along with those of Calabresi and Melamed.34  In low transaction costs settings (where 
both the costs of meeting and reaching agreement are low), property rules are preferable 
to liability rules.  In high transaction cost settings, liability rules are preferable to property 
rules.  In intermediate transaction cost settings, either rule could dominate depending on 
the balance between the costs of expropriation and the costs of failed bargains.35 
 To show the greater fit or predictive capacity of this framework, consider a few of 
the cases that fall within the intermediate transaction cost category.  One is nuisance law.  
The costs of meeting are low in the nuisance setting because the parties are often adjacent 
landowners.  The costs of reaching agreement are often substantial because the precise 
entitlement (clean air) is difficult to define.36  Another example is eminent domain.  The 
cost to the government of meeting a property owner to discuss a possible purchase is low, 
but the cost of reaching agreement may be high because of the hold-out problem.37  A 
liability rule is substituted for a property rule in both settings because the costs of 
                                                 
33 The costs of reaching agreement could be substantial because of informational asymmetries or because it 
is difficult to define the entitlement to be transferred. 
34 Id. at 6. 
35 A liability rule allows expropriation to occur (sometimes as the result of failed bargains), which will 
generate social costs, either as a result of the distorted incentives of victims or from the costly litigation that 
follows instances of expropriation.  A property rule results in a loss in allocative efficiency when a bargain 
fails and a wealth-enhancing transaction does not take place as a result.  If the social costs of failed 
bargains under the property rule are less than the social costs of expropriation under the liability rule, the 
property rule is preferable – and conversely.  See Hylton, supra note 17, at 40-42. 
36 Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. Legal Stud. 
13 (1995). 
37 Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 15, at 1106-1107. 
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property rule protection are perceived to be higher than the costs of liability rule 
protection.38 
 
B. Choice Among Liability Rules: Strict Liability Versus Negligence 
 
Assuming the conditions suggest that a liability rule is preferable to a property 
rule, the second question is: what type of liability rule?  The two general types are strict 
liability and negligence.  In mathematical models, strict liability is often treated as if it 
were the same as absolute liability.39  In the same models, the negligence rule is often 
treated as if it were determined by comparing the benefits of additional precaution (in 
terms of avoidable losses) with the burden of that precaution – an approach sometimes 
called the “Hand formula”.40 However, in reality both the strict liability and negligence 
rules actually used by courts are more complicated than those captured by the 
mathematical models.  The strict liability rules applied by courts provide justifications or 
defenses that an injurer can assert, rendering them far more lenient than an absolute 
liability rule.41  Negligence rules also provide special justifications and defenses that 
allow an injurer to escape liability even when the burden or additional precaution was 
less than the benefit in terms of avoidable losses.42 
                                                 
38 Hylton, supra note 17, at 40-42. 
39 Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1980). 
40 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and 
Under Negligence, 10 Intn’l Rev. Law and Econ. 161, 166 (1990) (presenting mathematical model of 
negligence rule, and “Hand formula”). 
41 Consider, for example, strict liability for dangerous activities, such as blasting.  The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts provides several provisions that introduce potential defenses.  See Restatement (Second) 
of Torts §§ 519, 520 (1977).  
42 The most obvious example of such a defense is contributory negligence.  See, e.g. Richard A. Epstein, 
Cases and Materials on Torts 287-290 (8th ed. 2004) (explaining contributory negligence rule). 
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For the moment, let us adhere to the simple division between strict liability and 
negligence, without making any attempt to incorporate the special justifications and 
defenses that make legal doctrine complicated.  When should we prefer strict liability to 
negligence? 
 One answer provided in the literature, from Guido Calabresi to Richard Posner to 
Steven Shavell, is that negligence controls only care levels while strict liability controls 
both care and activity levels.43  By care level, I refer to the instantaneous level of care 
that an individual adopts when engaging in an activity.  For example, one can increase his 
care level while driving by slowing down and watching the road ahead more closely.  By 
activity level, I refer to the extent to which an individual engages in an activity.  One can 
increase one’s activity level in driving by using the car more frequently – say, driving 
three times a day rather than twice. 
 Under the simplest economic models, strict liability and negligence have the same 
effects on care levels.44  Under either rule, an actor would always take additional care as 
long as the cost of that care is less than the losses avoided by that care.  The reason is as 
follows.  If additional care cost $1 and would avoid $2 in losses, the actor would clearly 
take that additional care under a strict liability rule.  He would certainly rather bear an 
additional $1 in precaution costs rather than $2 in liability costs.  The actor has the same 
incentive under negligence.  The reason is that as long as the additional precaution cost is 
less than the losses that would be avoided, the actor would be held liable under the 
negligence rule.  Given this, his incentives for precaution are the same under negligence 
as under strict liability. 
                                                 
43 Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Yale Univ. Press, 1970); 
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972); Shavell, supra note 36. 
44 See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 36. 
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 Now consider the level of activity.  Under strict liability, the actor pays for 
injuries even though he has exercised the optimal level of precaution – optimal in the 
sense that the burden of additional precaution would be greater than the losses that would 
be avoided.  Under negligence, the actor does not have to pay for injuries when he has 
exercised the optimal level of precaution.  Since the overall activity costs are higher 
under strict liability, the actor is less likely to engage in the activity.  Hence it is said that 
strict liability reduces activity levels while negligence does not.45 
 The activity versus care level distinction provides an explanation of the effects of 
strict liability and negligence, but it falls short of providing a positive theory of when one 
will encounter one rule rather than the other.  For the most part, strict liability rules are 
limited to specific pockets of tort law.  The activity-versus-care level distinction does not 
help us predict which pockets will be dominated by strict liability rules.  One could say 
that strict liability should be the rule whenever it is important to control activity levels,46 
but this merely restates the question, forcing us to ask when it is important to control 
activity rather than care levels.  And since the activity level concern is a general one, the 
activity-versus-care level distinction suggests that strict liability should be the default 
liability rule.47 
 Strict liability rules are limited to special pockets of tort law.  For example, 
blasting in developed areas falls under the strict liability rule.48  If you engage in blasting 
in a residential area you will be held liable for all losses caused by concussion and debris, 
                                                 
45 See id. 
46 Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1182 (7th Cir. 1990). 
47 E.g., Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Tort Doctrine and the Restatement of Torts, 54 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 
1413 (2001). 
48 See, e.g., Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E. 2d 31 (N.Y. 1969); Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliot & Watrous 
Engineering Co., 79 A. 2d 591 (R.I. 1951); Alonso v. Hills, 214 P.2d 50 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1950). 
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no matter how careful you are in conducting the blasting operation. You will not be liable 
to a victim who is considered “extra-sensitive” to the blasting operation, in the sense that 
the victim claims to have suffered a harm in an instance in which the ordinary person 
would have suffered no harm.49  However, if the blasting is carried on at a level that 
would have caused some harm to the ordinary resident, you will be held liable for those 
harms caused to residents, even if they are much greater than you would have anticipated. 
 The blasting example illustrates a general principle: strict liability rules are 
observed when the costs externalized by an activity, even when conducted with 
reasonable care, substantially exceed the benefits externalized by that activity.50  In other 
words, where the ratio of externalized costs to externalized benefits is unusually high, the 
law adopts a strict liability rule.  The reason the law imposes strict liability in these cases 
is to deter, discourage, or shrink the activity.  That explains why strict liability applies to 
blasting.  It is an activity that imposes a significant risk of harm on individuals who live 
or work near the blasting operation, even when it is conducted with great care, without in 
most cases providing some contemporaneous benefit that makes it worth their while to 
tolerate those harms.  By imposing strict liability, the law internalizes the harms 
associated with blasting and thereby discourages the use of blasting relative to other 
methods of destruction (e.g., wrecking ball) in areas in which harms to third parties are 
likely to occur. 
 The principle requiring comparison of externalized risks and benefits also 
explains why the keeping of dangerous animals, like lions, falls under the strict liability 
                                                 
49 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 524A (1977) (exempting defendant from strict liability for 
“Plaintiff’s Abnormally Sensitive Activity”). 
50 Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 977 (1996). 
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rule.51  An individual who keeps a lion penned in his backyard imposes a great risk on his 
neighbors, while at the same time providing no significant benefit – unless, the lion 
holder is operating a zoo.52  In the absence of strict liability, the benefits of holding a lion 
are typically enjoyed by the holder alone while the substantial costs are externalized to 
others (even when the holder is taking reasonable care).  Strict liability corrects the lion 
holder’s incentives by forcing him to compare his private benefits to the full costs to his 
neighbors.  
 The doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher offers another illustration of the ratio test 
proposed here.53  Rylands imposes strict liability for “non-natural” uses of land that 
escape and cause damage to others.  In Rylands, strict liability was imposed on the 
defendant when water escaped from a reservoir constructed on his land and flooded 
mines on the plaintiff’s land.  The court argued that the storage of water under the 
conditions in the case imposed an extraordinary risk on adjacent landowners, greater than 
any reciprocal risk imposed by the adjacent land owners.54 
 The best illustration of the function of externalized benefits in the Rylands 
doctrine is given by the case of Rickards v. Lothian.55  The defendant leased a 
commercial building with a lavatory on the fourth floor.  The plaintiff was a tenant whose 
business occupied part of the second floor.  An unknown person snuck into the building 
late one night, stuffed the sink, turned the faucet on full blast, and left it running 
overnight.  The next morning, the plaintiff found his stock-in-trade (largely schoolbooks) 
                                                 
51 See, e.g., Baker v. Snell, [1908] 2 K.B. 825. 
52 See, e.g., Guzzi v. New York Zoological Society, 182 N.Y.S. 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 1920), aff’d, 233 N.Y. 
511 (1922) (distinguishing holding of bear in zoo from nuisance per se cases because of educational 
function); City and County of Denver v. Kennedy, 476 P.2d 762 (Colo. App. 1970). 
53 Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R 3 H.L. 330 (1868). 
54 Id. at 332. 
55 [1913] AC 263. 
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ruined, and brought a strict liability suit against the defendant on the theory that the 
introduction of the lavatory was equivalent to the reservoir in Rylands.  The court 
rejected the plaintiff’s claim.  The court noted that “the provision of a proper supply of 
water to the various parts of a house is not only reasonable, but has become, in 
accordance with modern sanitary views, an almost necessary feature of town life.”56 
 The difference between Rickards and Rylands is that the ratio of externalized 
benefits to externalized costs is quite different in the two cases.  In Rickards, the 
provision of water supply to a building provides benefits to all who use the building.  
These benefits are difficult to capture in the rental fee demanded of a tenant, and it is 
quite unlikely that the tenant’s use of water was metered with a charge that reflected the 
marginal benefit to the tenant of water use.  Since the externalized benefits in this 
scenario were substantial, there is no reason to believe that the risk externalized by the 
introduction of a lavatory was greater than the externalized benefits.  However, in 
Rylands the court had no trouble concluding that the externalized risks exceeded the 
externalized benefits. 
 It remains to fold into this analysis the function of transaction costs.  Rylands 
establishes the law for a set of cases sometimes referred to as “abnormally dangerous 
activities”,57 and for simplicity I will refer to as “the Rylands cases”.  If transaction costs 
are low in the Rylands cases, one might argue that they should be treated as just another 
set of cases in which property rule protection, such as trespass law, should be adopted.  
However, transaction costs are higher in the Rylands cases than in ordinary trespass cases 
for several reasons.  First, the injurer in the Rylands setting is not directly attempting to 
                                                 
56 Id. at 273. 
57 Restatement of Torts (Second) § 520 (1977). 
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invade the victim’s land.  He is merely bringing something onto his own land that might 
escape.  Second, the direction of the potential escape may not be clear, making it difficult 
to bargain ex ante over a waiver for the harm that might occur.  A large number of 
potential victims creates the risk that one or more will step forward and demand to be 
paid off even though the risk to them is slight.  Transaction costs are therefore 
considerably higher in the Rylands than in the trespass setting because of the difficulty of 
identifying ex ante the parties that will be injured and the nature of their injuries.  For this 
reason, Rylands cases should be treated either as intermediate or high transaction cost 
cases. 
 Nuisance cases are quite similar to Rylands cases and should therefore be treated 
as equivalent in terms of the factors considered here.  Transaction costs in most nuisance 
cases are either intermediate or high.  As Merrill notes, the entitlement at stake in 
nuisance cases is often difficult to define (e.g., the right to clean air or absence of 
noise).58  The difficulty of defining the entitlement makes it hard for parties to bargain 
over its value.  Moreover, nuisances may generate large numbers of victims, which also 
makes bargaining over rights difficult.59 
 The foregoing argument can be summarized in a simple diagram.  There are three 
transaction costs categories: high, intermediate, and low.  The ratio test requires a 
comparison of the externalized costs to the externalized benefits (EC versus EB in the 
                                                 
58 Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. Legal Stud. 
13 (1995).  
59 I refer specifically to the hold-out problems that would arise in this scenario.  For example, if a polluter 
had to gain the consent of 1,000 town residents before starting production, some of the residents might 
realize that they could gain an advantage by holding out for a payment that comes close to the profit stream 
of the polluting firm.   For discussion, see A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 
13-16 (New York: Aspen Publishers, 3d ed. 2003) (examining Coase theorem in a large numbers setting). 
 19
diagram below) connected to the injurer’s activity.  This framework generates six cases to 
consider, as shown in the box in Figure 1. 
 
 
                  High Transaction      Intermediate Transaction       Low Transaction 
                        Costs                                Costs                                 Costs 
 
EC>EB        Liability rule:                Hybrid Property                  Property rule 
                     Strict liability                  Liability rule:                 protecting victim:   
                   Property rule if            Nuisance (unreasonable             trespass 
                  injurer’s activity                 interference) 
                is socially undesirable 
 
EC<EB        Liability rule:               Weak Negligence:            Weak Negligence:             
                      Negligence                    Custom defense                Intent to Harm                
                                                           (e.g., malpractice)            (e.g., defamation)                                              
                                                        Nuisance (reasonable            Implied Consent 
              interference                (e.g., assumption of risk) 
 
 
Figure 1.Transaction Costs, Externalization, and Liability Rules 
 
 
The “weak negligence” rules described in Figure 1 refer to areas in which there is 
a quasi-property rule protecting the injurer rather than the victim.  For example, in the 
last cell (low transaction costs, externalized benefits greater than externalized costs), we 
encounter legal rules that require proof of intent to harm in order to find the injurer liable. 
Defamation is an example of such a rule.  The law provides several defenses that 
effectively immunize tort defendants, and this was so before New York Times v. 
Sullivan.60  Defamation law has included so many defenses that one could describe it as 
an area in which the plaintiff needs to show specific intent to harm in order to recover.61  
As a general rule, “information torts” such as defamation and intentional infliction of 
                                                 
60 367 U.S. 254 (1964). 
61 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 132-42 (1881) (discussing actions for deceit and 
slander). 
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emotional distress generally fall in the category in which transaction costs are low and the 
externalized benefits of the defendant’s activity exceed externalized costs.62  And with 
respect to information torts, one typically observes substantial defenses and high burdens 
in the way of tort plaintiffs.  
In the penultimate cell (intermediate transaction costs, externalized benefits 
greater than externalized costs), the negligence rule applies, but there are substantial 
defenses that come very close to providing immunity to the defendant.  For example, 
medical malpractice is an area in which transaction costs can be described as 
intermediate, because the costs of meeting are low while the costs of reaching agreement 
are high because of informational asymmetry.  Also, the externalized costs connected to 
the activity are generally less than the externalized benefits.63  Here the law tends to favor 
the injurer.  Although juries may sometimes be vulnerable to persuasion by plaintiff’s 
lawyers, the law provides a substantial custom defense for doctors.64 
 The existence of defenses that virtually immunize defendants reflects a type of 
property rule lurking behind the categories shown in the bottom row of Figure 1.  When 
externalized benefits are generally greater than externalized costs, the underlying 
                                                 
62 To elaborate, because the external benefits of speech are substantial, the law has provided a subsidy, in 
effect, to speakers by allowing them to be held liable under an intent-to-harm rather than a negligence rule.  
Consider, for example, how defamation law fits within this framework.  The activity level decision in the 
news business is the decision to publish or to publish a certain frequency.  Taking care in the news business 
is a matter of researching claims in articles and opinion pieces with care.  A strict or absolute liability 
standard would hold newspapers liable for any defamatory claims, whether carefully researched or not.  A 
negligence standard would hold a publisher liable for any failure to take care in research that results in 
defamatory claims.  An intent-to-harm standard, which is close to the real law, would hold a publisher 
liable only when the evidence suggests some malice or bad intent.  The law adopts the most lenient 
standard for potential defendants, which is the intent-to-harm approach, and in doing so provides a partial 
subsidy to news publishers.  The negligence standard would be too strict, under this paper’s framework, 
because it fails to credit the defendant for the benefits externalized by free expression.  
63 One could represent the external cost and external benefit comparison in terms of marginal benefit and 
marginal cost curves.  For this approach, see Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory, supra note 47. 
64 On the custom defense in medical malpractice, see, e.g, Epstein, Cases and Materials, supra note 39, at 
204. 
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property rule should be awarded to the injurer.  That is, the injurer should have a right to 
engage in his activity without fear of being enjoined or of strict liability.  If society is 
made better off, after all, by the very activity that causes injury, that activity should be 
encouraged.  As transaction costs fall, potential victims are in a better position to demand 
payments and to effectively enjoin the defendant’s activity if the underlying property rule 
protects the victim, and for this reason it would be undesirable to award the property rule 
to the victim.  The law, in effect, reverses the property rule from its usual position 
protecting the victim and makes it a shield for the potential injurer, by providing defenses 
of broad scope. 
  When transaction costs are high, liability rules predominate except in one instance 
shown in Figure 1.  When the injurer’s activity is socially undesirable, which means that 
the social costs from the injurer’s activity exceed the social benefits at every scale of the 
activity,65 the property rule reappears.  This exception covers the case of reckless activity, 
or activity that presents a danger to the public such as terrorism. 
 
IV. Application to Cyberspace 
 
The central premise of this paper is that tort law can be applied to cyberspace 
wrongs in a way that is reconcilable with established tort doctrine.  However, in order to 
do that we need to first have a clear view of the theoretical foundations of tort doctrine.  
The foregoing discussion sets out that view.  The remaining parts apply it to cyberspace 
torts. 
                                                 
65 In terms of marginal benefit and marginal cost curves, this would be a case in which the marginal benefit 
curve is below the marginal cost curve at all levels of the activity. 
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A. Nonconsensual Cyber-Invasions: Property Rules Versus Liability Rules 
 
I have already described Hamidi, which involved the sending of thousands of 
messages to the employer-provided email of Intel employees, as a case involving the 
choice between property rules and liability rules in cyberspace.  Hamidi is one example 
within a class of torts that can be called cyber-invasions.  Cyber-invasions can occur in 
two forms.  In one set of instances, the invader breaches norms governing publicly 
accessible information portals, such as sending spam email or collecting information 
from a website for a purpose that breaches the terms of a “click-through” agreement or 
that the information provider would find objectionable (e.g., competing against the 
information provider).66  In another set of instances, the invader goes around barriers to 
gain access to information that is not publicly available or to alter privately-held records.  
I will consider these two types of cyber-invasion separately. 
 
1. Invading a Public Information Resource 
 
The first type of cyber-invasion I want to consider, invasion of a public 
information resource, involves cases such as the sending of spam email in Hamidi.  I 
refer to this as a public resource invasion because the recipient of spam email holds his 
email box open to the public; there is no expectation or requirement that an email sender 
                                                 
66 See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 1 Cal. Rptr. 32 (Cal. 2003); eBay v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. 100 F.Supp. 2d 
1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Register.com v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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first get permission to send an email.  Spam email can be viewed as an invasion because 
it is undesirable to the typical recipient. 
Recall that in Hamidi, the court accepted the plaintiff’s theory that trespass to 
chattels (i.e., trespass to personal property) was a claim that could result in a remedy of 
an injunction or damages against the sender of spam email.67  However, the court held 
that in order to enjoin the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff had to bring evidence of 
substantial harm to his property.68  Intel had produced no evidence that Hamidi’s actions 
actually harmed the company’s electronic mail system, and for that reason the court 
refused to enjoin Hamidi.69 
 There are other cases in which the trespass-to-chattels theory has been accepted, 
leading to an injunction.  For example in eBay v. Bidder’s Edge70 the court held that the 
plaintiff, eBay, could enjoin Bidder’s Edge from sending electronic spiders to its web site 
because those spiders were thought to be capable of impairing the functioning of eBay’s 
website. 
 The first question raised by Hamidi is a general one concerning the power to 
enjoin.  The plaintiff’s power to enjoin the defendant’s conduct has been a relatively 
murky issue in the law of trespass to chattels.  The Restatement has taken the position 
that the plaintiff in a trespass to chattels action cannot enjoin the defendant’s conduct 
unless he can show that it actually causes an injury.71  However, some courts have 
suggested that the mere trespass to personal property gives rise to a right to seek damages 
                                                 
67 Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300 (Cal. 2003). 
68 Id. at 303. 
69 Id. at 303-4. 
70 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
71 Restatement of Torts (Second), § 218 comment e, illus.2 (1977).  A child climbs upon the back of B’s 
large dog and pulls its ears.  No harm is done to the dog, or to any other legally protected interest of B.  A 
is not liable to B. 
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and to enjoin the defendant’s conduct.72  These courts have proceeded under the view that 
the law governing trespass to real property and that governing trespass to chattels should 
be the same. 
 The point at which established law gives an uncertain or doubtful answer is where 
theory should play a role in figuring out what the law should say.  Why has the law given 
plaintiffs a power to enjoin under traditional (real property) trespass law?  The reason, 
according to the theory of property rules, is to protect the plaintiff’s subjective valuation 
of his property.  If the plaintiff cannot enjoin another party’s use, then that party can 
expropriate or destroy all or part of the value of the plaintiff’s property.  In view of this, 
there is no clear reason why the power to enjoin should be weaker in the case of personal 
property than it is in the case of real property. 
 Suppose, for example, a third party happens to find a key that matches my car’s 
ignition.  Assume I make little use of my car – say, only on Sundays – and otherwise 
don’t see the car because it is parked in a garage far from my house.  The third party uses 
the car without my consent and without causing any measurable or perceptible damage of 
any sort – e.g., he uses the car to meet his paramour for trysts.  Should I lose the power to 
enjoin or to seek damages simply because I cannot prove that the third party’s use 
actually damages my car?  The theory of property rules suggests that I should not lose the 
power to enjoin, because the power to enjoin permits me to demand to be compensated 
for whatever subjective loss I suffer in having my car used by the third party. 
                                                 
72 Blondell v. Consolidated Gas Co., 43 A. 817 (Md. 1899).  Moreover, English common law did not 
require a showing of substantial harm in a trespass-to-chattels action.  See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, 
Property Along the Tort Spectrum: Trespass to Chattels and the Anglo-American Doctrinal Divergence, 
forthcoming 35 Common L. World Rev. (June 2006). 
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 This implies that the power to enjoin should, as a default rule, always be assumed 
to belong to the property holder under trespass law, whether the property is real or 
personal.73  To weaken that power, as courts have done in Hamidi and eBay, is to 
undermine one of the fundamental protections provided by trespass doctrine.  These cases 
declare that a liability rule remedy should replace a property rule remedy in a special 
setting in which property rule protection appears to be appropriate in the court’s eyes.74  
The danger is that this approach could leech back into ordinary trespass rules governing 
real property. 
 The second question raised by Hamidi is whether property rule protection is 
appropriate in the circumstances.  This depends on several factors, summarized earlier in 
Figure 1.  First, transaction costs: the case for property rule protection becomes stronger 
as transaction costs fall.  Second, the direction of property rule protection has to be 
determined.  Property rule protection can protect either the victim or the invader.  This 
requires a comparison of the externalized costs and benefits of the injurer’s activity. 
 As it becomes easier for a cyberspace user to gain permission before sending an 
email or accessing a website (that is, as transaction costs fall), the case for protecting 
someone with a property rule becomes stronger.  A property rule protecting the potential 
victim would be equivalent to the familiar trespass law.  A property rule protecting the 
invader (e.g., the email sender) would be equivalent to one of the weak negligence rules 
described earlier.  For example, it might say in effect that the person initiating the email 
                                                 
73 See Richard A. Epstein, Intel v. Hamidi, The Role of Self-Help in Cyberspace?, 1 J. Law, Economics, & 
Policy 147, 151 (2005); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, supra note 58 (noting that English law did not require a 
showing of harm). 
74 To be clear, this is not to say that property rule protection really would be appropriate in the Hamidi or 
eBay fact settings.  I am saying that the courts in eBay and Hamidi have made the confusing statement that 
(a) property rule protection is appropriate and (b) that in order to protect the interests at stake the only 
remedy they would permit is a liability rule.  For an alternative description of the confusion, in doctrinal 
terms, see Mossoff, supra note 4, at 645. 
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has the right, ordinarily, to do so unless he has waived that right, or unless he knows in 
advance of some specific and substantial harm that the email will bring to the recipient. 
  As the court itself noted in Hamidi, this is a bit like asking whether there should 
be a property rule governing phone calls.75  The answer seems relatively clear in that 
case.  A person acquires a phone in order to communicate with others.  Indeed, its value 
rises directly in proportion to the number of others who also have phones.  A phone, a fax 
machine, and electronic mail system are all examples of communication portals that 
allow us to connect to others.  Although it might be relatively cheap to contact one person 
in order to seek permission to place a phone call to him, in the aggregate this would be a 
costly system, and would destroy a substantial part of the network value of the phone 
system.  The expense would be unnecessary, in addition, since most people would agree 
to being contacted by phone.  If there is any property rule that is desirable in the case of 
telephone calls, it would appear to be one that protects the invader, i.e., the person 
initiating the call. 
 The same argument applies to the electronic mail system in Hamidi.  Although it 
would be simple for one individual to contact another or a corporation to seek permission 
to send an email, it would be a substantial cost when viewed in light of the interest in 
rapid un-intrusive contact that motivates people to use electronic mail in the first place.  
Given the network effects that make ownership of an email account valuable, the system-
wide costs of a property rule protecting potential recipients of unwanted mail could be 
enormous.  In addition, because the whole purpose of the system is to allow rapid and 
widespread communication, the vast majority of users would waive property rule 
protection if it were given to them.  Since people acquire email accounts as a 
                                                 
75 Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 299-300 (Cal. 2003). 
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communication portal, the value they perceive expropriated by the occasional unwanted 
email is trivial. 
 The upshot is that trespass, which operates as a property rule protecting the 
victim, is an inappropriate rule to apply to cases like Hamidi involving unwanted emails 
and to cases like eBay involving website access.  Indeed, the reason courts have applied a 
diluted trespass rule (requiring substantial harm) to certain types of cyber-invasion is 
from a recognition of the costs of property rule protection favoring email recipients or 
website operators.  While accepting plaintiff’s trespass to chattels theory, the Hamidi 
court spoke at length about the inconveniences created by rules requiring consent in these 
settings.76 
 Given that a property rule protecting the victim is inappropriate, what is the 
proper tort rule to apply to unwanted emails?  In the case of a single email or the typical 
email exchange, the underlying activity is one in which the externalized benefits 
generally exceed the externalized costs.  This is true in general for “information torts” – 
because information is a public good, the law tends to set standards that are difficult for 
plaintiffs to satisfy.  Since the transaction costs are, at least in a significant set of 
instances, low in the case of a single email, a property rule is certainly feasible in this 
area.  The foregoing analysis suggests that the preferable property rule (assuming some 
type of property rule is appropriate) is one protecting the invader/email initiator.  This 
suggests that the ideal rule in the case of an unwanted email that causes harm to the 
recipient would hold the email sender liable only if the evidence shows that he knew with 
substantial certainty that the email recipient would be harmed by opening the email. 
                                                 
76 Id. at 318.  However, technology could drive transaction costs so low that a system of prior consent for 
emails could become operational with no obstruction to the value of the network.  At present, that does not 
appear to be the case. 
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 Of course, with emails, as with all things, there can be too much of a good thing.  
Suppose, instead of a single email, we are considering a spammer who sends 50,000 
emails at a time to a single server.  What tort rule should apply?  The spammer’s activity 
is generally desirable in the case of a single email or reasonable number of emails.  But 
spammers create burdens on recipients by sending thousands of emails at a time.77  The 
conduct has characteristics most common with nuisances.78 The spammer’s conduct 
imposes external losses that often exceed the externalized gains.  In addition, transaction 
costs are in some respects low, and in others quite high in the email context.  A person 
who wants to engage in mass distribution of email after first gaining the consent of 
recipients would run into the large numbers problems that arise in nuisance settings.79  
Given these characteristics, mass email distribution that results in harm to recipients 
belongs in the same category as nuisances resulting in unreasonable interferences. 
 This analysis applies as well to eBay.  In general, if a programmer sends 
electronic spiders through the internet to gather information and relay them to another 
source, say another website, that activity merely enhances the dissemination of 
information.  Enhanced information dissemination allows markets to work more 
efficiently in allocating resources.  For this reason, the externalized benefits of the 
programmer’s conduct probably exceed the externalized costs.  In addition, because of 
the large numbers problems encountered in the nuisance and Rylands settings, the 
transaction costs under a property rule could be quite high. 
                                                 
77 See Mossoff, supra note 4, at 650-52 (detailing burdens imposed by spammers). 
78 The argument that the harms suffered in spam cases seem closest to the harms observed in nuisance 
cases, see Mossoff, supra note 4, Mark Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 Cal.L. Rev. 521, 540 (2003); 
Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1275 (2002); Burk, O’Rourke 
supra note 4. 
79 I refer to the hold-out problems that would arise in this scenario, see supra note 56. 
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 These arguments suggest that a property rule protecting the victim of spidering 
would be socially undesirable.  For reasons similar to those given in the spammer 
context, nuisance theory has a better fit to the problem.  If spidering occurs on a scale that 
disrupts the functioning of the victim’s website, as the court believed had occurred in 
eBay,80 then the injurer’s activity should be deemed an unreasonable interference under 
nuisance theory. 
 An alternative theory of the harm in eBay is that the information dissemination 
itself may have been harmful to eBay because it might have steered potential users away 
from the eBay site.81  This is a doubtful theory on which to award tort damages.  Tort law 
early on took the position that competition itself does not give rise to a claim for 
damages.82  If a business sets up close to a rival and charges lower prices, that rival has 
no claim for damages under tort law.  Given this long-standing common law rule, it 
would seem quite strange for a court to award damages to eBay on the theory that 
Bidder’s Edge would take business away from it by disseminating information more 
widely about alternatives available to potential customers. 
 If there is an argument for damages under this alternative theory, it would be 
based on the doctrine developed in business tort cases, and in ancient nuisance cases.  For 
example, some of the earliest business tort cases, cast as nuisance cases, involved cream-
                                                 
80 100 F. Supp. 2d, at 1071. 
81 For the most persuasive version of this argument, see Daniel Kearney, Note, Network Effects and the 
Emerging Doctrine of Cybertrespass, 23 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 313 (2005).  The theory presented in 
Kearney’s note is that in the presence of network externalities, it may be optimal to protect a monopoly.  
Breaking up the monopoly leads to some efficiency losses.  While this theory suggests that private steps to 
maintain a monopoly may be socially justifiable in the presence of network externalities, it does not readily 
imply that the law should be altered to protect some firms (specifically those that produce a service that 
generates network externalities) from competition. 
82 Holmes, supra note 58, at 144-5. 
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skimming competition among local markets or fairs.83  A rival who set up a fair on the 
road leading to an established one could be held liable for nuisance.84  The intuition for 
this is that the rival’s activity is a particularly discouraging form of free riding.85  At the 
time when fairs were a common method of forming markets in which sellers and buyers 
could meet, it must have been quite costly for an entrepreneur to establish one.  It would 
have required a great deal of effort in finding sellers and advertising to potential buyers.  
A competitor who waited for the entrepreneur to invest in this way, and then set up a 
competing fair on the most-traveled route, could easily skim away a large part of the 
entrepreneur’s profit while investing only a fraction of the cost.  If this conduct were 
allowed to go unimpeded, few entrepreneurs would have established fairs in the first 
place. 
 One could try to extend the reasoning of these ancient nuisance cases to the eBay 
case.  However, to avoid creating a set of rules that obstruct competition, courts would 
have to be careful to put sharp limits on the type of case that would be viewed favorably.  
It would have to be a case in which the late entrant’s efforts both took advantage of a 
substantial investment on the part of the initial entrant, and had the effect of denying the 
initial entrant a suitable return on his investment.86  The misappropriation theory 
recognized by the Supreme Court in International News Service v. Associated Press 
provides a useful approach to setting limits to a theory based on harmful competition.87 
                                                 
83 Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution 211 (Cambridge 




87 See International News Service v. Associated Press 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (upholding injunction against 
taking news from east-coast Associated Press papers and printing it in west-coast newspapers in the 
competing INS network).  For a discussion of the case, see Douglas G. Baird, Property, Natural Monopoly, 
and the Uneasy Legacy of INS v. AP, University of Chicago Working Paper, Olin Working Paper No. 246, 
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 Property rules protecting victims of spam email or spiders are generally 
inappropriate, given the theoretical structure of tort law.  If there is any property rule that 
should underlie this activity at all, it is one protecting the invader (e.g., the email sender), 
since his conduct is generally beneficial to society.  If the victim is to be protected at all, 
liability rules rather than property rules should apply generally.  Cases such as Hamidi 
and eBay seem particularly well suited for the liability rule approach exemplified by 
nuisance doctrine.  This is not to say that property rules protecting victims could never be 
appropriate for cyberspace.  Indeed, if transaction costs are low and the injurer’s activity 
is of low social utility, a property rule protecting the victim could be appropriate.  But the 
cases of invasion of a public information resource that the courts have dealt with under 
the trespass to chattels doctrine do not fit this description.  For those cases, nuisance 
doctrine, not trespass, provides the better framework. 
 
2. Invading a Private Information Resource and Always-Undesirable Activity 
 
The second type of cyber-invasion involves going around barriers to gain access 
to privately-held information.  For example, consider a database that is accessible only to 
customers who pay a fee.  Suppose a non-customer gains access to the database by 
breaking a code that is available only to paying customers or to a certain class of 
                                                                                                                                                 
June 2005, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=730024.  The misappropriation theory seems to be 
applicable to cases such as EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001) and 
Register.com v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir.2004).  In Explorica, the new competitor (Explorica) 
used a specially-designed search robot to gather information on prices from the incumbent firm’s (EF) 
website, using inside information on the website’s structure.  Explorica used the information to undercut 
EF’s prices.  In Register.com, the new competitor (Verio) used a search robot to obtain information on 
entities that had registered their internet domain names through Register.  Verio then contacted the 
registrants to solicit business.  Some of those registrants had requested that their information not be used 
for solicitation purposes.  Neither case was decided on the basis of the misappropriation theory. 
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customers.88  Alternatively, consider the case of a psychiatrist who goes beyond the scope 
of her authority to peruse medical records of patients, simply to satisfy her own curiosity 
about them.89  Or suppose a programmer writes a “Trojan Horse” program that invades 
the victim’s computer by arriving as an email attachment from a familiar source, and the 
program then distributes information from that computer to others.90 
 Would a property rule protecting the victim, such as the trespass-to-chattels 
doctrine, be desirable in these cases?  This question returns us to the factors that make 
property rules desirable.  A property rule is desirable when transaction costs are low.  A 
property rule protecting the victim (rather than the injurer) is desirable when the 
underlying activity of the injurer is externalizes more costs than benefits. 
 Transaction costs have to be examined in light of the reality of social intercourse.  
In the case of uninvited emails, the background rule governing social intercourse is one 
that approves of the sending of uninvited email.  Individuals acquire communication 
portals, such as telephones or email accounts, so that they can be reached by others 
without first having to give those others an invitation.91  In the cases in which the invader 
accesses private information, such as information protected by a code or by using a 
Trojan Horse to invade, there is no sense in which potential victims accept this as part of 
the cost of acquiring a computer that connects to the internet.92  Any invasion of private 
                                                 
88 See, e.g., Physicians Interactive v. Lathian Sys. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22868 (E.D. Va. Dec. 5, 2003). 
89 See, e.g. Doe v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., No.CIV.00-100-M (D.N.H. July 19, 2001). 
90 Timothy L. O’Brien, Gone Spear-Phishin’: For a New Breed of Hackers, This Time It’s Personal, 
N.Y.Times, Sunday, December 4, 2005 (Sunday Business Section at pages 1 and 7). 
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phone number available in public sources, it is fair to infer that he is willing to be contacted by strangers or 
by people who have not been invited to call. 
92 The consent issue is also present in the case of “spyware” software that monitors a computer user’s 
activities.  Most spyware finds its way onto computers after users click on a download button.  See Blakley, 
Alan F., Garrie, Daniel and Armstrong, Matthew, "Coddling Spies: Why the Law Doesn't Adequately 
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information should be presumed to expropriate something of value unless it occurs with 
the consent of the invaded party.  Moreover, since the cost of gaining consent is low, the 
cases of invaders who access private information should be treated as occurring in a low 
transaction cost setting.  This implies that a property rule is desirable in the context of 
cyber-invasions of private information stocks. 
 Should the property rule protect the victim?  As a general default rule covering 
tangible and intangible things, a rule protecting the possessor is superior to its alternative, 
because the possessor is likely to value the thing more than some other party; and a rule 
protecting invaders would lead countless non-possessors to threaten invasion simply to be 
paid off.  Moreover, there is nothing generically socially desirable about the conduct of 
the invader in the cases of access to private information.  The invader simply takes 
something of value to the victim rather than paying for it.  The conduct is no more 
valuable to society than any other type of theft. 
 The theory of property rules suggests that property rule protection is valid in the 
case of an invasion of private information – Trojan Horses, surveillance, cyber-burglary 
in the form of breaking access codes.  This implies that courts should recognize a right to 
enjoin even if the plaintiff cannot prove that he suffered a substantial harm.  For example, 
the psychiatric patient whose medical records are examined by a doctor, not for treatment 
purposes but just out of curiosity, should be permitted to enjoin the conduct and seek 
                                                                                                                                                 
Address Computer Spyware", at page 4, Duke Law & Technology Review, Forthcoming Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=901998.  Most users are unaware that by “clicking through” they have 
agreed to accept spyware on their machines. Id.  The difficulty in the spyware case, which distinguishes it 
from the Trojan Horse, is that a person who “clicks through” may be saying, in effect, that they are 
indifferent about the spyware that may be downloaded as a result, as long as the spyware is not harmful to 
them.  Because of this difficulty, courts considering the consent question in spyware cases have reached in 
consistent conclusions; see, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29-30 (2d Cir. 
2002) (applying California law, holding that there was no consent); i.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout 
Service Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002) (finding consent). 
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damages even in the absence of proof of some material injury.93  The substantial harm 
requirement of Hamidi seems clearly inappropriate in this setting. 
 It follows that plaintiffs should be able to seek punitive damage awards against 
invaders of private information.  In some cases, the victim’s loss will not be easy to 
determine, and a punitive award may be the simplest way to motivate litigation and at the 
same time deter invaders.  Punitive awards should be set so that they at least eliminate 
any prospect of gain on the part of the invader and internalize the loss suffered by the 
victim.94 
 Public enforcement through criminal penalties may also be appropriate in some 
instances involving invasion of private information resources.  Invasions of private 
resources share a great deal in common with environmental crimes.  There is often a low 
probability of detection, which in turn introduces collective action problems at the 
enforcement stage.95  In addition, the penalties (damage awards) that will be imposed 
through private litigation are likely to be far too low to serve as an adequate deterrent.96  
Criminal statutes, such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,97 serve a potentially 
important deterrent function in this setting. 
 In the general analysis of property and liability rules, property rules are desirable 
in low transaction cost settings and in high transaction cost settings in which the injurer’s 
activity is always socially undesirable.  The discussion so far has focused on instances in 
which a property rule is desirable in the cyberspace context primarily because transaction 
                                                 
93 E.g., Doe v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr, supra note 83. 
94 Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 Geo. L. J. 421 (1998). 
95 Keith N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regulation?, 41 Washburn L. J. 
515, 518-19 (2002). 
96 Id. 
97 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000). 
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costs are low.  For example, the psychiatrist who uses the internet to peruse the private 
medical records of a patient without authorization has the option of seeking consent from 
the patient. 
 There are other examples in which the injuring party has no specific target and 
would therefore find it hard to gain consent.  In these examples, transaction costs are 
high.  Still, society may prefer to apply a property rule on the ground that the underlying 
activity of the injuring party has no social value whatsoever.  One example would be 
posting virus-contaminated files on the internet.  This is analogous to leaving a package 
with a bomb in a parking lot.  In this case, the cost of transacting with the victim is high 
because the injurer does not know who the victim will be.  But he does know that there 
will be a victim.  Since the injurer’s conduct has no value to society whatsoever, a 
property rule protecting the victim should apply.   The injuring party’s activity is a 
candidate for an injunction, and for punitive damages in the event that an injured party 
brings suit. 
 Punitive awards and criminal penalties have in common the requirement of 
evidence that the defendant intended to harm the victims or was at least indifferent to the 
victims’ welfare.98  The issue of intent may generate exceptional cases in which a cyber-
invasion of a private resource has occurred and yet punitive sanctions are inappropriate.  
Consider, for example, the case of teenage computer prodigy who invades a private 
information resource in order to show his technical prowess to friends rather than cause 
harm to anyone or to gain an advantage.99  The harm done by the prodigy may still be 
                                                 
98 See, e.g., Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996), Proctor v. Davis 682 N.E.2d 1203, 1216 (Ill. 
App. Dist. 1 1997). 
99 See, e.g., Bill Goodwin, “Teenage Hackers Shame IT Industry Again,” Computer Weekly On-Line, May 
21, 2004 available at http://www.zone-h.org/content/view/4183/31/ (virus technologist states that teens 
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substantial and deserving of punishment.  But this example suggests that cyber-invasions 
of private information resources may occur in settings in which the intent to harm is 
lacking, which should moderate demands for punitive damages or criminal penalties. 
 
B. Type of Liability Rule 
 
I have argued to this point that property rules are appropriate for cyber-invasions 
of private information resources (e.g., Trojan Horses that steal or destroy information) 
and for the always socially undesirable activity of unleashing viruses.  Property rules are 
inappropriate for cyber-invasions of public information resources (e.g., spam email).  
If property rules protecting victims are generally inappropriate for cyberspace 
invasions of public information resources, what sorts of liability rules should be adopted, 
and precisely where should they be adopted?  Should courts adopt strict liability, 
negligence, or a rule of no liability in some settings?  To answer these questions, we will 
have to consider the different settings in which liability for cyberspace torts might be 
asserted. 
 First consider the problem of cybersecurity.100  One could say that cybersecurity 
is a general problem that encompasses every case discussed in this paper.  For example, 
perhaps better cybersecurity would have prevented Hamidi from distributing thousands of 
                                                                                                                                                 
often write and unleash viruses to show off to their friends); Chris Cobbs, “Hackers Use Their Quest for 
‘Trophies’ to Clog Web,” The Orlando Sentinel, February 11, 2000 available at 
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in the hacker community and to boast about their ability to wreak havoc on the web). 
100 On the economics of cybercrime and its prevention, see Mark F. Grady and Francesco Parisi, eds., The 
Law and Economics of Cybersecurity (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006); Neal Katyal, Criminal Law in 
Cyberspace, 149 U Penn. L. Rev. 1003 (2001). 
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emails to Intel’s employees.  However, I will use cybersecurity here to refer to threats 
posed by hackers or virus creators. 
 Consider just a few examples of the damage that hackers can do.  The Loveletter 
virus, launched on May 4, 2000, altered graphic and music files, making them useless.101  
People who had spent countless hours building up electronic libraries of music found 
their work destroyed.  The virus affected roughly 45 million computers and is estimated 
to have caused almost $9 billion in damage worldwide.102  The SoBig virus is estimated 
to have caused almost $30 billion in losses worldwide.103  The Klez virus caused almost 
$14 billion in damage.104  In addition to viruses, the other big source of harm that has 
become increasingly common is theft of information.  The Federal Trade Commission 
estimated that theft of data caused $50 billion in losses in the U.S. in 2004.105 
 It follows readily from the previous section of this paper that direct claims against 
hackers should be governed by property rules.  A hacker is analogous, in many cases, to a 
vandal who spray paints someone’s house.  Since the hacker intends to destroy 
someone’s property, he can seek permission before acting – in other words, transaction 
costs are low.  In addition, since his activity is socially undesirable at any scale, it should 
be completely deterred rather than taxed by a liability rule.106 
 The question taken up here, which is the dominant question in the cybersecurity 
literature, is whether a third party should be held strictly liable for the harms caused by 
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hackers and virus creators – sometimes referred to as indirect liability.107  The third 
parties typically mentioned are internet service providers and operating system sellers.  
Since they are not the authors of viruses, property rules should not be, and probably 
cannot be, applied against them.  I will therefore consider the arguments for liability rules 
and for immunity below. 
 
1. Strict Liability 
 
As I noted before, the dominant policy issue in the cybersecurity setting is 
whether any third party should be held strictly liable (indirect liability) for the harms 
caused by hackers and virus creators.  There are several third parties who could be 
considered candidates for liability.  One is the internet service provider.  Strict liability 
for internet service providers might lead them to monitor the activities of users, which 
might help them identify hackers.  Another candidate is an operating system 
manufacturer, on the theory that it could have taken steps to reduce the damage caused by 
a hacker – say by fixing a security flaw in the operating system.  Alternatively, in the 
case of a hacker who gains information from electronic files, the owner of those files 
could be held strictly liable. 
 To determine whether strict liability would be desirable, we should return to the 
basic principles developed in the previous part of this paper.  Strict liability differs from 
negligence in the sense that it affects activity levels.  It forces the liable party to think 
about how frequently it wishes to engage in the activity giving rise to liability, or to think 
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about deep design changes that would reduce the frequency of injuries even when the 
activity is undertaken with optimal care. 
 The second basic principle is that strict liability should be applied when there is a 
noticeable imbalance between externalized benefits and externalized costs connected to 
an activity.  For example, the common law applies strict liability to blasting because the 
ratio of externalized costs to externalized benefits is unusually high, even when the 
blasting is conducted with optimal care. 
 A key case illustrating the limits of strict liability is Rickards v. Lothian.  Recall 
that an intruder gains access to the lavatory in the defendant’s building and intentionally 
causes a flood that damages the business property of the plaintiff tenant.  The court held 
that the defendant was not strictly liable because the activity of providing a lavatory 
externalized more benefits than costs to tenants of the defendant’s building. 
 The principle illustrated by Rickards is evident in other cases as well.  Consider, 
for example, the provision of natural gas.  The gas is highly flammable and could cause 
enormous damage if it escapes.  However, natural gas companies are not held strictly 
liable for the harmful escapes (mostly explosions in the case of natural gas) that do occur.  
The reason is that the provision of gas provides substantial benefits to the communities 
that are connected to gas supply.108 
 Now let us apply this reasoning to the virus creator.  In many respects, the internet 
service provider is like the building owner in Rickards.  The internet service provider 
allows the internet user to connect to a stream of code which includes some harmful 
computer viruses.  Or, one could say that the operating system manufacturer is similar to 
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the building owner in Rickards, while the internet service provider is similar to the water 
supply company.  The unknown wrongdoer who stuffs the sink and turns on the water is 
closely analogous to the virus creator or hacker. 
 This analogy suggests the conclusion that the internet service provider and 
operating system manufacturer should not be held strictly liable for the conduct of the 
hacker.  They have jointly provided an information resource that benefits the internet 
user, just as the water provision in Rickards benefited the plaintiff.  Moreover, given that 
the potential harmful resource in the virus case is information, public goods theory 
suggests that strict liability would be inefficient given the external benefits associated 
with enhanced information dissemination.109 
Although my focus to this point has been on viruses and hackers, the question 
whether strict indirect liability is socially desirable has arisen in the context of copyright 
violations and file sharing over the internet.  The foregoing argument against strict 
liability applies to the claims for copyright infringement liability against the developers 
of peer-to-peer file sharing networks, which was considered in MGM Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd.110  Since peer-to-peer file sharing networks clearly have socially desirable 
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What about the option of liability based on negligence?  As a general rule, the 
answer to this question is yes.  The negligence standard is the default liability rule in tort 
law.  Islands of strict liability and those of tort immunity appear to be relatively 
infrequent exceptions encountered in a sea of negligence law.  However, even on this 
question we have to consider the specific form of the negligence charge, including 
possible defenses. 
 Negligence assertions come in three general forms.  One is negligence in 
operation, a charge that the defendant was negligent in his conduct, e.g., in operating a 
car.  A second is negligence in design, a charge that the defendant was negligent in the 
manner in which he designed some object that played a role in causing the plaintiff’s 
harm.  The third is negligence in informing or warning, a charge that the defendant was 
negligent in failing to inform the plaintiff of a foreseeable injury.  In the case of a claim 
of indirect liability for a virus, the defendant operating system seller typically has taken 
no positive action in the course of its routine that led directly to the harm.  As a 
consequence, the types of negligence charges against the operating system seller usually 
will be either negligence in design or negligence in warning.  In the case of the internet 
service provider, all three types of negligence claim might be available to a plaintiff. 
 Negligent design and warning claims include, as special cases, most product 
liability actions.  Product liability lawsuits are often described as strict liability.  
However, product liability lawsuits based on defective designs and warning failures are 
grounded in negligence doctrine rather than strict liability.  The only category of product 
liability claim in which truly strict liability is observed is that involving manufacturing 
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defects – i.e., glitches in the manufacturing process that result in 1 out of every 1000 or 
so products being defective. 
 
3. Proximate Cause and Intervention 
 
The negligence in design issue was addressed in Rickards.  The plaintiff had 
received an award from the trial court on the ground that the defendant could have used 
an alternative sink design that would have reduced the likelihood of harm to the plaintiff.  
The House of Lords reversed this part of the trial court’s decision, holding that 
intervention on the part of the unknown wrongdoer severed the chain of causation 
between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s harm.112  In other words, the court 
held that the defendant’s negligence in design was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s 
harm, given the intervention of the sink stuffer. 
 The intervention holding in Rickards is consistent with the traditional view courts 
took at the time of that decision to the proximate cause question, when the harm was 
caused by intentional intervening conduct.  During the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, courts tended to treat intentional interventions such as that observed in 
Rickards as sufficient to prove lack of proximate cause – though there were exceptions to 
this approach even then.  Modern cases have begun to take a less rigid approach.113  
                                                 
112 [1913] A.C. 263, at 282. 
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Some jurisdictions, for example, have held car owners liable when they have negligently 
left their keys in the car and a thief has stolen the car and injured a pedestrian.114 
 Courts have yet to articulate a clear principle distinguishing cases in which a 
defendant will be held liable for the intentional acts of an intervening party.115  However, 
the cases do suggest some factors that make liability more likely.  One is the case in 
which the plaintiff has relied on the defendant to take steps to prevent the very injury that 
occurs.  For example, in Janof v. Newsom,116 the plaintiff employer relied on the 
employment agency to do a background check on the potential employee.  The agency 
recommended a potential employee without conducting an investigation, and the 
employee robbed the plaintiff.  
 The reliance factor suggests that the harm that occurs to the victim is highly 
foreseeable.  When a potential victim of some harm relies on another person to take steps 
to prevent that harm, the potential victim often forgoes self-protective steps that they 
would ordinarily have taken.  In Janof, the plaintiff employer conducted no background 
search on his own because he assumed the employment agency would do a search, and 
bring to his attention any problems or not recommend the potential employee at all.  The 
principle suggested by Janof is that if the plaintiff’s reliance is of a degree that the 
plaintiff forgoes significant self-protective steps that he would ordinarily take, because of 
reliance on the defendant’s efforts, then the intervention of a third party will not sever the 
chain of causation between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury. 
 Another set of cases in which courts have found the defendant liable in spite of 
third party intervention is when the defendant’s negligence effectively disables or leaves 
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 44
the plaintiff in a position where he or she cannot take steps to avoid the harm, and the 
defendant itself could have protected the plaintiff from the harm.  For example, in Brower 
v. New York Central & H.R.R.,117 the railway defendant negligently collided with the 
plaintiff’s horse-drawn wagon.  The wagon was destroyed, as was the horse, and its 
contents were strewn about the street.  The plaintiff remained in a state of shock as 
thieves came along and ran off with his property.  The railway’s security agents stood 
guard to protect the train as all of this was occurring.  Another case with the same general 
characteristics is Hines v. Garrett,118 where the defendant railway negligently passed the 
plaintiff’s stop and let her off almost a mile away from it, requiring her to walk through 
an unsettled area.  The plaintiff was raped as she tried to walk back to her intended 
destination. 
 Janof, Brower, and Hines are all cases decided in the period in which courts 
tended to adhere to the traditional view that intervention by a third party breaks the chain 
of causation between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury.  They establish 
clear exceptions to the intervention rule.  More modern cases tend to rely on the general 
concept of foreseeability, which does not provide clear doctrinal guidelines. 
 Returning to the cyberspace problem, how should the intervention of a hacker be 
treated?  Suppose a plaintiff brings suit against an internet service provider or operating 
system seller on the theory that the defendant should have taken greater precautions to 
avoid the harm caused by the hacker.  Should the intervention of a hacker be treated as 
severing the chain of causation between any negligence on the part of the defendant and 
the plaintiff’s injury? 
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118 108 S.E. 690 (Va. 1921) 
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 The question of intervention in the cyberspace setting can be approached in light 
of the traditional rules or in light of the modern foreseeability approach.  The former 
approach is much more predictable, since the cases give fairly clear exceptions to the rule 
that intervention severs the causal chain.  The later cases require a fact specific inquiry, 
the outcome of which probably could not be predicted in the absence of a real case.  For 
this reason, I will focus on the traditional rules in this part. 
 The traditional rules suggest that the answer to the question of intervention 
depends on the type of negligence that is asserted and proved in court.  Janof suggests 
that if the plaintiff reasonably relied on the defendant taking some particular precaution, 
and for this reason failed to take care on his own, the defendant could be held liable even 
though the injury resulted from the intervention of a third party.  In the cyberspace 
context, this means that an internet user could recover from an internet service provider if 
the user relied on the provider for some precaution, thereby failing to take precaution 
himself, and suffered a loss as a result of a computer virus. 
 The question this takes us to is whether there are instances of such reliance in the 
cyberspace setting.  Clearly, it is an empirical question and cannot be answered on the 
basis of armchair speculation.  A real case would have to present a set of facts that bring 
this question to life.  However, in most run-of-the-mill cases of virus contamination, 
internet users are not relying on a particular precaution taken by an internet service 
provider or operating system seller.  If I choose to download a file from the Social 
Science Research Network electronic library, a warning appears telling me that it could 
contain a virus.  After seeing the warning, I choose whether to download the file.  In this 
scenario, I do not rely on a specific precaution taken by the internet service provider or 
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operating system seller.  Even if no warning were provided, it is now common knowledge 
that a file downloaded from a website could contain a virus.  Armed with common 
knowledge, or informed by the warning, I have no reason to rely on some special 
precaution taken by the internet service provider or by the operating system seller.119 
 Again, the answer to the reliance question is in the end an empirical matter.  We 
might have a different case if I had approached an internet website to download a file and 
had a reasonable basis for believing that in the absence of a pop up warning my operating 
system would not be exposed to a computer virus.  Suppose, for example, I had been 
trained into relying on the warning, and one did not appear when it should have (for 
example, when I went to download a paper from the Social Science Research Network 
website).  These might present cases in which the design flaw exposes the operating 
system seller to liability, though it would be difficult for the plaintiff to show that he 
reasonably relied on the warning given the circumstances.  Since most computer users 
know that a virus can be contracted by downloading a file (and software licenses waive 
legal claims for such harms), it would be difficult for a plaintiff to prove that it was 
reasonable for him to assume that it was perfectly safe to download a file from the 
internet. 
 The other basis for holding the defendant liable in spite of the third party’s 
intervention is the case in which the defendant’s conduct disables the plaintiff from 
taking precaution, leaving him vulnerable to the third party.120  Suppose, for example, a 
design flaw in a security patch disables the operating system’s defenses or renders the 
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operating system especially vulnerable to a particular virus.  The user downloads the 
security patch and his computer contracts the virus.  This might be considered analogous 
to cases like Brower and Hines, where the defendant’s negligence puts the plaintiff in a 
particularly vulnerable position with respect to the intervening wrongdoer. 
 Now consider the general foreseeability test as a way of determining whether an 
internet service provider or operating system seller should be liable for the harms caused 
by a hacker or virus creator.  Instead of looking at particular types of negligence in 
conjunction with reliance or the disabling of the plaintiff, we should now consider any 
possible fact scenario in which a court might hold that the defendant should have taken a 
precaution in order to prevent a harm caused by an intervening party. 
 As I noted before, the general foreseeability approach is fact specific and could 
easily lead to (or not lead to) liability depending on how courts weigh the costs and 
benefits of a particular precaution.  Because of the uncertainty surrounding this approach, 
the only useful thought exercise that can be conducted at this stage is to consider the 
general type of negligence asserted and the likely defenses. 
 The most general type of negligence assertion is that the internet service provider 
failed to take precautions or the operating system seller failed to correct some flaw in its 
software that left users vulnerable to the work of a hacker.  Since software design is 
imperfect, and since hackers search for ways to exploit security flaws, I assume there are 
many potential fact scenarios that could be asserted to support such a negligence claim.  
Moreover, in each case, it might appear from a hindsight-based test that the defendant 
was negligent.  After all, software code is just code.  Presumably any competent 
programmer could correct a flaw, viewed in isolation, once it has been identified.  Since 
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the cost of correcting a particular flaw would appear to be low (just write some more 
code), and the possible harm to the victim potentially high, the plaintiff’s negligence 
theory would appear to be plausible. 
 But this analysis of a hypothetical negligence claim is incomplete, for several 
reasons.  First, measuring the burden of precaution by looking at the cost of fixing an 
isolated flaw is probably incorrect on economic grounds.  Second, fixing flaws or 
preventing hacker attacks requires a level of intrusion that raises troubling issues on its 
own.121  Third, given that the enemy is difficult to identify and constantly changing its 
strategy, any precaution taken must avoid making the problem worse. 
 The burden of precaution involved in fixing a software flaw probably looks low to 
most people on a hindsight-based test.  But with a complicated, evolved, software 
product, such as an operating system, the precaution cost probably should not be 
measured in isolation.  If there are N functional components in communication with each 
other, then a hacker presumably has something like N! ways to exploit a flaw in one 
component in order to contaminate or damage the whole system.  After one particular 
path has been chosen, the fix seems cheap.  But before a particular path has been chosen, 
the fix is quite difficult. 
 In addition to the burden being potentially enormous, the level of intrusion 
required to fix a flaw or prevent an attack raises troubling issues.  An operating system 
seller can make a security patch available, but in the absence of prior consent cannot 
install it on its own or force a computer user to install it.  An operating system seller or an 
                                                 
121 See, e.g., Harper, supra note 96. 
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internet service provider might be able to identify a hacker.122  But the seller or provider, 
short of passing information to government authorities, has no legal authority to prevent 
the hacker from accessing the internet – and even attempting to do so would be futile, 
since the hacker could always gain access from an alternative site.  And if an operating 
system seller or internet access provider were somehow to block internet access to users 
meeting a certain profile, even in a case in which it leads to an unambiguous 
improvement in society’s welfare, most people would be concerned about the loss of 
privacy and freedom of expression this would entail.  This is a part of the burden of 
preventing hacker attacks. 
 The information market concerns that would lead one to be wary of imposing a 
duty on an internet service provider or operating system seller to prevent hackers from 
launching attacks might seem to suggest that the standards for information torts (e.g., 
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress) would be appropriate for 
determining indirect liability for hacker attacks.  However, these standards are not 
directly applicable to the case of indirect liability.  The liability standard for information 
torts such as defamation is a difficult one for plaintiffs to meet, but that is because it is 
the defendant’s activity that brings information to the market.  In the case of a hacker or 
virus creator, the complaint against the operating system seller or internet service 
provider is not related to bringing information to the market.  The complaint is that it 
should have taken steps to prevent one individual from harming another.  Information 
                                                 
122 Of course, one question here is whether a private party will have an incentive to identify a hacker.  
Operating system sellers and internet service providers are repeat players, and therefore should have strong 
incentives to identify hackers.  Private firms that hold records are not necessarily repeat players, and 
therefore may not have strong incentives to identify hackers.  Resources that record-holding firms invest in 
identifying hackers provide benefits to other firms, including rivals.  For this reason, record-holding firms 
may have inadequate incentives to identify hackers.  For an economic analysis of this issue, see Bruce 
Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of the Private and Social Costs of the Provision of Cybersecurity and 
Other Public Security Goods, 14 S. Ct. Econ .Rev. 261 (2006). 
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market concerns are relevant but not a controlling factor here in determining the proper 
liability standard. 
 An analogous case involves the duty of a psychologist to take steps to protect a 
third party who is named by one of the psychologist’s patients as the target of a planned 
assault.  In Tarasoff,123 the court imposed a duty to warn the potential victim when the 
patient makes a credible threat involving a specific targeted individual.  Tarasoff remains 
controversial because of the concern that a duty to warn would discourage open dialogue 
between the patient and his therapist.  In this respect, Tarasoff reflects the information-
market concerns observed in the area of information-based torts such as defamation.  
However, courts following Tarasoff have attempted to strike a balance between the 
information-market concerns and the goal of minimizing harm by requiring warnings 
only in instances of specific and credible threats.124 
 The principle of Tarasoff appears to apply to the case of the hacker and the third 
parties who could prevent his attacks.  Moreover, the principle would appear to apply 
whether the third party attempts to prevent the hacker from acting or to warn the potential 
victim.  It may be feasible for an internet service provider or operating system seller to 
prevent some hacker attacks by monitoring internet activity.   However, because of the 
information-market concerns (loss of privacy, control of expression), this sort of 
intervention is easier to defend if the internet service provider has reliable information 
involving credible threats against a specific target.  Of course, even under these 
circumstances, it may be impossible to prevent a hacker from launching an attack. 
                                                 
123 Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
124 See, e.g., Hedlund v. Superior Court, 669 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1983); Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 
Cal. 3d 741 (Cal. 1980); Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197 (Cal. 1982). 
 51
 Warning the potential victim is an obvious precautionary option that has the 
benefit of appearing not to be a futile exercise.  But the usefulness of a warning depends 
on the circumstances.125  If it is infeasible to issue a warning in time to prevent the attack, 
then it cannot be considered a useful precautionary step, and no court should impose a 
duty to warn under these conditions.  In addition, a warning may backfire by creating the 
very problem the operating system seller or internet service provider is trying to avoid.  
For example, a warning to potential victims that tells them that their operating systems 
have a specific vulnerability and need to be patched may spur a hacker to try to exploit 
the vulnerability.  The usual procedure in the industry is for a security patch to be 
developed and made available to computer users without broadcasting the existence of a 
particular vulnerability.126  However, the presumably rare case in which an internet 
service provider or operating system seller obtains information about a specific attack 
planned against a specific target would appear to be one in which a duty to warn would 
be appropriate, as in Tarasoff.  Whether the failure to give a warning in such a case 
would be negligent is a different issue, and would depend on the burden and likely 




                                                 
125 On the economics of cyber-attack warnings, see Peter P. Swire, A Model for when Disclosure Helps 
Security: What is Different about Computer and Network Security, in Grady and Parisi, eds., supra note 
100.   
126 Ashish Arora, Rahul Telang, Hao Xu, Optimal Policy for Software Vulnerability Disclosure, at page 
2,Working Paper in SSRN electronic library, 2004, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=669023.  
 52
The information market concerns lead naturally into a discussion of the immunity 
issue exemplified by Blumenthal v. Drudge.  Recall that America Online was held 
immune to a defamation claim brought by Sidney Blumenthal because it was protected 
by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA).127  Given that America 
Online’s relationship to Drudge was indistinguishable from that between the New York 
Times and one of its columnists, the outcome of Blumenthal is difficult to defend.  It is a 
long-settled matter of law that publishers are vicariously liable for the statements of the 
writers whose work they publish. 
 The general issue raised by Blumenthal is the extent to which internet service 
providers should be vicariously liable for the content that they make available to their 
subscribers.  While Blumenthal appears to be a case in which vicarious liability would 
have been found in the absence of the protecting statute, a more troubling case involves 
statements posted in online discussion areas (bulletin boards, or chatrooms).  The CDA 
certainly protects internet service providers from liability in those cases as well, but I am 
now asking whether there is a basis in tort doctrine for this protection. 
 The immunity question returns us to Rickards v. Lothian.  The anonymous person 
who posts a false negative comment about your business in an online bulletin board can 
be analogized to the unknown sink stuffer in Rickards.  The internet service provider’s 
general activity, including the provision of the online bulletin board, is beneficial to 
society – like the provision of water in Rickards.  The principle reflected in Rickards 
suggests that internet service providers should not be vicariously liable for defamatory 
                                                 
127 Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000). 
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comments posted in online discussion areas over which they assert virtually no control.128  
But this is different from the Blumenthal case, where the internet service provider did 
control the content.  To make Blumenthal similar to Rickards, we would have to change 
the facts of Rickards so that the defendant building lessee actually stuffs the sink.  And if 
the defendant stuffed the sink in Rickards, he would clearly be liable for the damage done 
to the second-floor tenant.  
 The Communications Decency Act was a reaction to the failure of at least one 
court to draw the distinctions just drawn between appropriate and inappropriate cases for 
vicarious liability.129  The statute itself was an overreaction that has led to a far broader 
immunity shield than would be implied by common law tort doctrine. 
 The last real-world problem to consider is liability for theft of information.  The 
issues here are in some instances academic since cases of information theft do not always 
lead immediately to a substantial and quantifiable harm to the victims.130  If someone 
steals your medical records, what is the harm to you?  Obviously, if someone steals your 
“medical identity” and uses it to obtain fraudulent prescriptions, there is a potential harm 
if you are required to pay for those prescriptions or if the identity thief’s conduct prevents 
you from obtaining your medicine. But if they take your information and never reveal it 
to anyone, you have arguably suffered no harm. 
                                                 
128 This principle was initially followed in Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991).  For a more recent case consistent with the principle but decided on the basis of the CDA, see 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). 
129 Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 805178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).  The House 
Conference Report on the Communications Decency Act states, “[o]ne of the specific purposes of [section 
230 of the Act] is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy…”  H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) 
(Conf. Rep.).  See also, Jay Zitter, Liability for Internet Service Provider for Internet or E-mail Defamation, 
84 A.L.R.5th 169 (2000). 
130 See Thomas M. Lenard and Paul H. Rubin, Much Ado About Notification, Regulation, 44-50 (Spring 
2006) (assessing costs of identity theft). 
 54
 Given the imprecise and inchoate nature of the injury to victims, there is the 
possibility that firms that hold information electronically may take inadequate steps to 
prevent its theft.131  After all, if the information is stolen, it may take a long time before 
some victim becomes aware of some way that they have been harmed as a result. 
 In spite of the imprecise and inchoate nature of the injury, tort law should be 
sufficient to regulate the incentives of data holders.132  Cases of information theft would 
appear to be ideal for class action attorneys.  They involve small losses spread across 
large numbers of victims.  There is nothing to prevent courts from estimating the 
potential losses to victims and forcing the negligent data holder to set up a fund to 
compensate those losses.133  Where the information holder has been negligent, the penalty 
generated by class action litigants should be large enough to deter future negligence.  
Moreover, this is in theory superior on deterrence grounds to a scheme involving 
statutory penalties, because the damage judgments awarded in class actions will have a 
closer fit to the actual harm suffered by victims than would statutorily-set penalties. 
 A potentially superior approach to class actions seeking compensatory damages 
would be restitution-based claims against corporations that failed to protect personal 
information.  If, for example, a corporation has profited from permitting the personal 
                                                 
131 As Bruce Kobayashi suggests, they are likely to have inadequate incentives to identify hackers, see 
Kobayashi, supra note 118.  In addition to this problem, if the harm to victims is difficult to predict and 
likely to appear many years after the data security breach occurs, firms may choose to ignore the risk of 
liability for data security breaches. 
132 An alternative to tort law is to permit the reputation market to pressure firms to protect personal data.  In 
order for the reputation market to work, data breaches would have to be disclosed in a way that signals the 
importance of the breach.  See Schwartz, Paul M. and Janger, Edward J., "Notification of Data Security 
Breaches"  Michigan Law Review, Vol. 105 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=908709. 
133 Obviously, there should be a concern for fraud under this system.  The losses should be estimated by 
competent analysts and supported by credible evidence. The widespread fraud observed recently in the 
silicosis litigation should not be permitted to occur in this area.  On the silicosis fraud, see Silicosis Ruling 
Could Revamp Legal Landscape, by Wayne Goodman, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5244935.  
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information of customers to be stolen,134 plaintiffs should be able to bring a claim for 
disgorgement of the corporation’s gains from that theft.  In addition, if the corporation’s 
conduct can be characterized as intentional, a punitive award should be added to the 
restitution-based judgment.  Specifically, the punitive award should be a multiple of the 
disgorgement remedy, with the multiple set in order to offset the prospect that the 




This paper has applied the theory of property rules and liability rules to 
cyberspace torts.  That theory suggests that trespass doctrine is appropriate in instances of 
cyber-invasions of private information resources, such as the breaking of codes to access 
private information on the web.  However, trespass doctrine should play no role in 
instances of cyber-invasions of public information resources, such as the sending of 
unwanted emails in Hamidi or the information gathering in eBay.  Cyber-invasions of 
public information resources can be analogized either to nuisance or to negligence cases.  
Nuisance doctrine appears on both theoretical and practical grounds to provide the best 
fit. 
Another set of cases that might lead to liability are those in which plaintiffs assert 
indirect liability claims against operating system sellers or internet service providers for 
                                                 
134 Suppose, for example, a retailer encourages customers to apply for gift cards, and an identity thief 
applies for several thousand dollars worth of gift cards and spends them quickly.  If the store’s security 
system is so weak that these events occur frequently, a plaintiff’s lawyer could take the high frequency of 
occurrence as evidence that the retailer either recklessly or intentionally permitted identity theft to occur.  
For a journalistic account of the various identity theft scams and recent case law, see Jason Krause, Stolen 
Lives, ABA Journal, March 2006, at 36. 
135 Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 Geo. L. J. 421, 439-444  
(1996) (setting out algorithm for punitive awards). 
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the harms caused by certain actors (virus writers, copyright violators).  The theory 
presented here suggests that the basis for strict indirect liability is weak.  Negligence 
principles apply here, as elsewhere, though special attention should be given to proximate 
causation issues and the peculiar burdens of preventing virus attacks.  Finally, the theory 
suggests that immunity rules should also play a role in this area, though in a much 
smaller set of instances than those protected by the Communications Decency Act. 
